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The 1979 Reform policy 
 
The reform policy of 1979 ushered in the household responsibility system, allegedly 
going along with the sentiments of the peasants who defied the policies from above 
that imposed the collectivist people’s commune. The fingerprint oath taken by 18 
villagers of Xiaogang Village (小岗村, literally Small Mount Village) in Anhui 
Province in Dec 1978 became a well known historical exhibit, illustrating the 
determination of peasants to divide up collective assets for more effective 
management of production. 
 
Blood fingerprint oath by 18 villagers of Xiaogang Village for Household Responsibility System 
 
In contrast, another fingerprint oath, also by peasants, was taken in precisely an 
opposite spirit. It was the case of the people’s commune members of Zhoujiazhuang 
(周家庄, literally Village of the Zhou Family). The oath was taken by the members in 
November 1982, appealing for the retention of the people’s commune. 
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Fingerprint oath by members of Zhoujiazhuang Production Brigade No.1 appealing for retention of the people’s 
commune 
 
Thus, we see that the mainstream policy of Reform effectively and largely dismantled 
the people’s commune system that had been in place for over a decade during the 
Cultural Revolution. Partly as an imperative policy from above, and partly as an 
aspiration of peasant households to claim their “own” right of usage over a piece of 
land, over 90% of rural assets that were collectively owned and managed by the 
village community have been de-collectivized. Nevertheless, fragments of collectivity 
have remained in diverse forms, with variations in terms of ownership or 
management. 
  
Before we take a look at the Zhoujiazhuang case, which has gone against the current 
and is an example of singularity, let us first take a brief look at two other cases that 
are much better known domestically and abroad: the Huaxi Village（华西村, literally 
West China Village）in Jiangsu Province near Shanghai, and the Nanjie Village（南街
村, literally South Street Village）in Henan Province.  
 
 
Huaxi and Nanjie – gold and red combined 
 
Huaxi Village, rural by administrative category, is a de facto industrial and financial 
conglomerate. In 2011, its total assets were valued at 16 billion yuan. The history of 
its Cinderella transformation is well known: in 1964, it was as poor as any other 
village in China. Inspired by the model of Dazhai, the village chief Wu Renbao（吴仁
宝）formulated a 15-year development plan for the village, and together with the 
villagers, carried out a restructuring of the village land by leveling the ground, 
rechanneling the river, reorganizing the fields, and in seven years, the village had a 
solid base for agricultural development. Yet, the village thrived not so much on 
agriculture, but on a move with foresight but risk: in 1969, during the peak of the 
Cultural Revolution, the villagers stealthily started their village hardware factory with 
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20 workers, at the back of the supervising political administration. Why would Wu 
Renbao take such a huge political risk? His eldest son said, “Simply because you 
cannot earn money through agriculture. The total annual agricultural output value was 
RMB 240,000 yuan, but the 20-worker factory could, within three years, produce the 
same output value of RMB 240,000.”1 In 1978, the year signaling the end of the 
Cultural Revolution, Huaxi Village had fixed assets of 1 million yuan, bank savings of 
1 million yuan, and three years of food provisions in the barn. 
With a much more privileged starting point compared to the others at the beginning of 
the Reform period, the rest of Huaxi’s success story is not too surprising. So we learn 
of how Wu Renbao surfed the waves in the early 1980s to set up a pesticide sprayer 
factory, in 1992 to hoard aluminum materials the price of which tripled in three 
months, in 1999 to get the first village-level corporation to be listed in the stock 
market, in 2002 to set up a steel factory in Hubei Province with an annual production 
capacity of 1.2 million tons, in 2010 to purchase two helicopters for eco-tour, and so 
on. To match the industrial development, since 2001, the original Huaxi Village of 
2000 population and 0.96 sq.km territory had merged with 20 neighbouring villages to 
form the Greater Huaxi Village, increasing the population to over 50,000 (half being 
migrant workers), and the territory to 35 sq.km. as of 2010. Villagers from the original 
Huaxi Village came under Huaxi Village One, and the others from Village Two to 
Thirteen.  
It was reported that in 2010, Huaxi’s annual production output amounted to 45 billion 
yuan, with a net profit of 3.5 billion yuan. Villagers of Huaxi Village One are 
“shareholders” entitled to lucrative social welfare and dividends, though not decision 
over the conglomerate’s major policies and strategies. Per capita assets was over 1 
million yuan, per capita annual income was 80,000 yuan, and each household had a 
living area of 500 sq.m. Huaxi’s wealth is symbolized by a 328-metre, 3-billion yuan 
skyscraper hotel, and a one-ton bull made of pure gold. 
                                                 
1
  See “华西村姓‘社’还是姓‘吴’”Is Huaxi Village named Socialist or Wu?”, 
17 Oct 2011, http://china.dwnews.com/news/2011-12-07/58381876.html,  
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One-ton gold bull on the 60th floor of the Huaxi skyscraper hotel 
In the case of Nanjie Village, whose wealth was not as spectacular as Huaxi’s, the 
resort to the ideological rhetoric of equality and class struggle was similar, with Mao 
Zedong’s 10-metre statue in the village central plaza and his portrait in every home. 
Nanjie Village, with a population of over 3000 and a territory of 1.78 sq.km, began its 
rise from poverty in 1980 when the village started two factories making wheat flour 
and bricks, lifting the village to a total industrial and agricultural output that year to 
400,000 yuan. What is interesting is the turn Nanjie Village made in the next few 
years. It followed the state policy of household responsibility system in 1981 and 
divided up land among village members; the two factories were contracted to 
individuals. However, the new owners made profits but did not pay wages to the 
workers, and much arable land was left fallow as agriculture did not bring profits. 
Thus, in 1984, the village committee led by the party secretary Wang Hongbin（王宏
斌）decided to respond to the anger of villagers, and recovered the factories under the 
village collective. Starting from 1986, villagers were encouraged to return their arable 
land to the village collective, and those so doing would be guaranteed 20 kg of wheat 
flour per person per month, as well as a job in the collective. This was good incentive 
for villagers to hand over their land. By 1991, Nanjie Village became known as the 
first village in Henan Province to reach a turnover of 100 million yuan, running 26 
enterprises. The collective had been fully covering housing, education, health and 
pension for its members. When the authors visited the Village last year, we learnt that 
the arable land was used to grow seeds for seeds companies, while food provisions 
were bought from the market. The village still used wheat flour coupons and edible 
oil coupons for some livelihood items. 
 
Media coverage of these two cases shows the controversies arising from ideological 
differences. The benefits for villagers from the collective in terms of employment, 
housing, education, health and even luxury goods such as cars and villas seemed 
indisputable, though these were guaranteed only by retaining one’s membership in the 
collective. Skeptical critics stressed the patriarchal nature of the operation of the 
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collectives, calling them autocracies depriving members of individual freedom and 
choice.  
 
In a word, we can see that both cases had surfed the current of capitalist production, 
and in particular had relied much on industrialization supported by bank loans and 
government grants. At the same time they had guaranteed the livelihood of members 
of the collective on the basis of egalitarian distribution. Livelihood-related matters, in 
a sense, were not monetized and abandoned to the dictatorship of the market. Indeed, 
the two cases may be regarded as examples of two large extended families 
maintaining more or less egalitarian principles in the realm of distribution under the 
tight grip of a patriarch within the family, but they were totally submitted to the 
imaginations and pursuits of capitalism. 
 
 
Zhoujiazhuang – its singularity 
 
Compared to the above cases symbolized by the colours of gold and red, another case 
deserves examination but has been scarcely reported by the mass media due to a 
preference of its leadership for low profile, and perhaps also due to its incongruence 
with the mainstream. This is the case of Zhoujiazhuang, admired by some and 
ridiculed by others as the only surviving “people’s commune” in China. Located 50 
km from Shijiazhuang, the provincial capital of Hebei Province, Zhoujiazhuang in the 
early 1980s resisted external pressures for it to divide up its assets among the 
commune members, and has persisted up to today in operating as a “people’s 
commune” in substance, and a “cooperative” in name. Readers may harbour doubts as 
to the nature of this “commune / cooperative”; in a commercialized world, anything 
may become a gimmick to draw attention and to sell in the market. However, this 
does not seem to be the case with Zhoujiazhuang, as it held at bay journalists and 
academics who attempted to poke their nose into the township, inclined to 
self-congratulatory tasks of mystification or de-mystification. Contextualized in the 
last three decades of China, this case is particularly interesting in illustrating the 
conditions and difficulties confronting the villagers in persevering in collectivist 
relations, while adapting to changing circumstances.   
 
The authors have browsed through available literature on the history of 
Zhoujiazhuang, made two visits to the township in the last year, and conversed with 
some leaders and ordinary villagers. Impressionistic as they may be, the thoughts 
presented here are an attempt to make sense of the aspirations, needs, wants, 
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frustrations and anxieties of the villagers in a specific locality, with a specific history. 
This preliminary study attempts to look at some of the conditions that make the 
practice of collectivism possible outside the dictates of capitalist relations, and 
glimpse into the difficulties and possibilities of the defense and management of 
collective property. The authors also hope to investigate into the way the villagers 
conceptualize “property” by studying how they look at themselves (for example, as 
peasants, or as entrepreneurs), and how they relate to land (for example, as 
commodity, or as the soil that gives life).  
 
Attributes of a “commune” 
 
The name Zhoujiazhuang may mislead one to think that the people’s commune has its 
cohesiveness derived from one same clan named Zhou. It turns out that the Zhou 
family which settled in this place during the Ming dynasty some three or four hundred 
years ago had fled the place after a few generations due to flooding, and the 
subsequent settlers from Henan and Shandong Provinces had no blood ties to the 
Zhou family. The name, lasting till today, reminds one of the once “common” nature 
of the territory – whoever came by and settled could access the land and water, live, 
produce, and reproduce.  
 
As is the case with many villages with outstanding performance, a patriarch-like 
figure is associated with Zhoujiazhuang in the modern times. The legendary figure 
Lei Jinhe (雷金河), born in 1921 and died in 2001, had left the traits of his principles 
and practices in the norms and habits of the commune. 
 
During the visits to the commune, the authors were impressed with the simplicity of 
the buildings where the township administrative powers were located. The old 
buildings from decades ago stood there in the government compound, rustic and 
unpretentious, forsaking images of “modernity” and “progress” so much craved by 
townships and villages with much less income. The authors were told by the current 
township chief Lei Zongkui (雷宗奎), grandson of Lei Jinhe, that such old buildings 
of the government administration would be a rare sight in the region. It is not as if 
Zhoujiazhuang villagers were not immuned to imaginations of modernity, and there 
had been proposals to replace these old buildings by modern ones. In 2007, some 
villagers proposed tearing down these old buildings to build new ones, the township 
leadership allocated 3-4 million yuan for this project, but eventually opted to use this 
fund to build a Peasant Cultural Park for public use. Only the front part of the 
reception hall of the government building was renovated and expanded to allow more 
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space for holding meetings.  
 
Such simplicity was echoed in the streamlined administrative structure of the 
township authorities. For a township of 13,000 population over a territory of 17.5 
sq.km., the entire rank of cadres was just over 40, which included the cook, the 
messenger, the accountant, etc. In 1979, when Lei Jinhe resumed his role as township 
chief after 12 years of detention during the Cultural Revolution, he dismissed 456 
administrative cadres and returned them to productive work.2 Now, cadres were 
multi-tasked. For example, since there had not been any crime in the village, there 
was little need for security staff to handle security matters. The police post set up by 
the authorities above had moved to another village. On our visit in July 2012, we 
found out that the township’s photographer was at the same time the security chief 
and the civil affairs officer. Without much redundancy, parasitic administrative costs 
were minimized.   
 
Bearing in mind the examples of Huaxi Village and Nanjie Village, recalling the 
mainstream criticism of these collectives on their authoritarianism and hierarchy, we 
tried to study this issue in the case of Zhoujiazhuang. Our preliminary finding is that 
there was authority but it was subject to public monitoring, there was little room for 
corruption and grafting, and the Zhoujiazhuang economic and social structure had 
sustained for almost six decades, with an interruption of about twelve years during the 
Cultural Revolution, and hence it had become accepted norms and habits shared by 
the entire community. The determining factor, we feel, was the “Three 
Responsibilities, One Award scheme” 三包一奖, which assigned to production teams 
the responsibilities over labour, output and costs, as well as award of bonus for 
surpluses. This scheme had been implemented with detailed and transparent 
accounting of the assigned work, hence the corresponding income, of the members of 
the commune.  
 
As this scheme was the foundation stone of the Zhoujiazhuang experience, we would 
like to detail its history, its practice, and its significance. It turned out that the scheme 
shared the ups and downs fate of its promoter, Lei Jinhe. The situation had stabilized 
after 1979, with the scheme established and accepted by the commune members as a 
norm, practiced continuously over three decades, up to today, 11 years since the death 
of Lei Jinhe.  
 
Story of a man and a collective 
                                                 
2
 周家庄春秋 P.121 
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Lei Jinhe, born to a poor peasant household in this poor village, joined the struggles 
against the local landlord, and later against Japanese invasion in the 1930s. He 
became a communist party member in 1944. During the battle against Japanese troops 
invading his village in April 1945, he narrowly escaped death but witnessed the 
killing of 17 fellow villagers in the underground tunnel. In 1946-47, he was involved 
in the struggles on land reform in the village, but he was attacked by the village land 
reform committee which was composed of the landlord’s men. In 1948, he won the 
fight and obtained land and land titles for 234 poor peasant households of his village.3  
 
The story of Lei Jinhe and the collective after the People’s Republic of China was set 
up is a story of an arduous, meandering trajectory of peasants responding with 
wisdom, craft and pragmatism to the volatility of political and economic campaigns 
and commands coming from above which were detached from the realities on the 
ground. 
 
In the winter of 1949, the first agricultural mutual aid group of three households was 
set up in the village. The first cooperative of 20 households was set up in Nov 1951, 
the first of its kind in the entire Jin County (晋县). In 1952, with support from the 
authorities above, one big cooperative with 102 households and nine small 
cooperatives each with around 20 households were formed. In February 1954, the 
Zhoujiazhuang Agricultural Production Cooperative was set up as a result of the 
merging of 10 cooperatives and 13 mutual aid groups; the 425 households joining the 
Cooperative constituted 87.8% of households in the village. The Soviet collective 
farms were the model.4 In February 1956, the Zhoujiazhuang Advanced Agricultural 
Production Inter-Village Cooperative was set up, with 1509 households from six 
villages. This was the fad at the time, and Inter-Village Cooperatives were set up 
everywhere in China. However, faced with natural disasters of frost and flood, many 
cooperatives pressurized the government to allow them to return to a smaller scale for 
easier management. In the whole Jin County, only two Inter-Village Cooperatives, 
Zhoujiazhuang and Donglizhuang（东里庄）, remained. After heated discussions 
within the six villages, involving 1635 households and 6896 cooperative members, it 
was decided not to divide up into smaller units, despite the pressure from the county 
government to do so. Then came the wave of forming people’s communes in 1958, 
and Zhoujiazhuang renamed itself Li’ming People’s Commune (黎明人民公社, 
literally Dawn People’s Commune), but soon after, it was ordered to merge with two 
                                                 
3
 周家庄春秋, p.40 
4 周家庄春秋, p.48 
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other townships to form Dongfeng People’s Commune (东风人民公社, literally East 
Wind People’s Commune) comprising over 10,000 households, so that there would be 
six big people’s communes in the entire county. After three years of famine and the 
frustrations of the people’s commune policy, an order came from above to dismantle 
the communes and divide production units to the scale of 20 households. In 1961, 
Zhoujiazhuang split from the Dongfeng People’s Commune and returned to the 
former status of a commune of 6 villages, with around 3000 households and 10,000 
population. It resisted the national policy at that time to divide into smaller production 
units; instead, it resumed the structure of 10 production brigades under 6 villages, 
with around 160 households per brigade.  
 
[what happened to the political administration of Zhoujiazhuang during the Cultural 
Revolution? Was it renamed, restructured?]  
 
This administrative structure had remained through the Cultural Revolution, despite 
changes in the command. When the Cultural Revolution was officially denounced in 
1978, the new government policy was to dismantle the people’s communes and 
implement the household responsibility system. Once again, Zhoujiazhuang commune 
members resisted this order, and eventually arrived at a compromise with the 
authorities: the existing structure and operation of the people’s commune would 
remain, but the commune would be renamed “Zhoujiazhuang Agricultural, Industrial 
and Commercial Corporation”.  
 
One may ask, what was the driving force behind the resistance of the Zhoujiazhuang 
collective against the mainstream political commands of the time, which were 
vacillating between big and small scales, and eventually going for atomization after 
1978? How did Zhoujiazhuang manage to persist in a form of production and 
distribution derived from its own experience and more or less the villagers’ will? It is 
therefore interesting to examine the key mechanisms that had sustained its persistence, 
which are cultural, political and economic. 
 
Three Responsibilities, One Award scheme 
 
The economic dimension was the Three Responsibilities, One Award Scheme. In 1953, 
the scheme was devised to meticulously record the labour contribution of each 
member of the collective. Work in the industries was accounted for by labour time and 
output. Agricultural work was listed under 372 categories. [Did the number of 
categories change over time?] The more contribution, the more reward. Responsibility 
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meant if the target was not reached, there would be penalty for all the brigade 
members. One year after this scheme was implemented, the labour productivity in the 
collective rose by 52%. This scheme was more sophisticated than conventional 
schemes of payment by piecework or payment by hour. After members of the 
collective agreed that the categories were fair and accepted the scheme, it became the 
criteria to determine the manner of work as well as the remuneration. [look for the 
story of how the different categories were determined, and how villagers were 
involved] So, on the one hand, homogenization of work or standardization of 
remuneration was avoided, and on the other hand, the differences among different 
types of work were recognized but also monitored. While the cooperative oversaw the 
overall planning and accounting, the ten production brigades would be responsible for 
production under its charge on its territory, as well as for allocation and recording of 
work by its members. The setting up of the Second Tractor Station of Hebei Province 
in Zhoujiazhuang in 1954 strengthened the economic development of the cooperative.  
 
Ironically, while this two-tier management scheme combining coordinated planning 
and local efficiency was a pride at the local and provincial levels in terms of its 
innovation, practicality and effectiveness, and was included in an oral report by the 
regional party secretary of Hebei Province to Mao Zedong in a train ride in 1963, 
Mao’s response was negative. He said, “this is philosophy of triviality, devised by 
intellectuals without practicality”.5 The scheme was shelved during the 12 years in 
the Cultural Revolution when Lei Jinhe was detained for the crime of taking a 
“capitalist road”. 
 
Yet it is this “capitalist-roader” who, when reinstated in 1978 as chief of the township, 
insisted on preserving the Three Responsibilities, One Award scheme as well as the 
people’s commune structure and institutions. The mainstream current of Household 
Responsibility System was overwhelming in 1979-82, and those resisting this would 
be regarded as politically incorrect. Yet, with his unyielding stamina, Lei Jinhe looked 
for wording in the central government’s documents and found the phrases “the wish 
of the local people should be respected” and “the policy should be adapted to the local 
circumstances” [check original wording] to justify his insistence, lobbied some central 
and provincial government leaders to allow the commune to prove itself. He made the 
guarantee: the commune could keep its preferred system only if it could outperform 
those which had shifted to the Household Responsibility System. A senior leader 
agreed to give them one year of leeway. The Three Responsibilities, One Award 
scheme, now reinstated, encouraged incentives of members of the collective but at the 
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same time had the superiority of planning of production and marketing. With typical 
peasant wisdom, Lei Jinhe saw that cotton was in short supply, and after a serious 
debate within the commune, he persuaded members on the strategy of growing more 
cotton and less grain. The cotton output increased by 4.8 times from 1978 to 1980. At 
the end of 1979, one year after Lei Jinhe resumed his role as chief, the commune 
gained so much income that it repaid the 180,000 yuan debt owed to the state, 
compensated commune members for the properties taken from them in previous years, 
and was still left with 1.61 million yuan of surplus. In the next few years, 
Zhoujiazhuang’s income were, respectively in 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983, 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx [fill in the figures]   
 
It was this economic performance that demonstrated the superiority of the 
Zhoujiazhuang collective, and underpinned Lei Jinhe’s stand to keep the institutions 
of the collective as they were. So, the change in name from Zhoujiazhuang People’s 
Commune to Zhoujiazhuang Agricultural, Industrial and Commercial Corporation, 
and later to Zhoujiazhuang Agricultural, Industrial and Commercial Cooperative 
which has lasted till today, was indeed in name only. In the following, for 
convenience, we will refer to Zhoujiazhuang as “people’s commune”, which is its 
substance as seen by its members and by society at large. 
 
The people’s commune as a collective was not, for Lei Jinhe, coerced collectivization 
against the will of the villagers. In fact, he had resisted the coerced collectivization 
with audacity. In 1958, on hearing the order to merge small communes into big 
communes, Lei Jinhe quickly mobilized villagers to construct buildings in every 
village. Why? He said, “Now all property is to become communist property, but they 
cannot demolish and take away our cattle sheds.” The commune-owned tractor was 
taken away despite his protest, but the buildings remained, of course.6 For this 
retention of assets in the commune, the commune got a political reprimand of a “black 
flag” from the authorities.  
 
However, at the start of the Reform in 1978, the same collective refused to be 
dismantled and relegated to atomized production under the dictates of the market. It is 
indeed an irony of history that Zhoujiazhuang operated as a people’s commune for the 
villagers only before and after the Cultural Revolution, whereas the Cultural 
Revolution was supposed to be the period supporting the political orthodoxy of 
people’s communes. What distinguished Zhoujiazhuang from other collectives which 
might share the name of “people’s communes” before 1978, or “corporations” or 
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“cooperatives” after 1978, was its down-to-earth practicality arising from a staunch 
peasants’ position to negotiate with the powers of the state or the market. Lei Jinhe 
said to the commune members, that the ideal would be to serve the interests of the 
state, the collective, and the individuals at the same time; yet if there were conflicts, 
then the latter two should be prioritized. 
 
Economic and political choices 
 
One may say that the patriarchal element is a key factor in the operation of the 
Zhoujiazhuang commune, and it seems apparent that Lei Jinhe’s spirit and style was 
an influential factor when he was in charge. Decision-making powers were deposited 
mainly with the chief and a dozen people in the collective. Yet this was not the full 
picture of how the commune operated in daily life, and the checks and balances that 
existed within the hierarchical structure. We need to go into the details, and find out 
how decisions were made, how they were received by the ordinary members of the 
commune, and elements of coercion or incentive that were effective or ineffective. 
 
Let us examine the way Zhoujiazhuang operated since the cooperative was set up in 
1951, up till now, except for the years of the Cultural Revolution when Lei Jinhe and 
most of the leadership were deposed from their position.7  
 
In the arena of production and distribution, the ten coordinators of the production 
brigades, through the Three Responsibilities One Award scheme, were the leaders 
solely responsible for making almost all decisions regarding the implementation of 
production tasks and distribution of income among their members. They were all 
subject first and foremost to the overall strategic planning and general regulations of 
the commune, made by the commune’s leadership. When strategic planning had been 
made, the ten brigade coordinators would design and operate the implementation 
plans; annually, they would submit brigade plans for the next year, and these were 
usually accepted without much revision, as the responsibility of meeting production 
targets lay with the brigade. The work-points of individual members were 
meticulously recorded according to over 370 work categories by the brigade, a 
year-end accounting would be made on the basis of the overall output value, award for 
surplus and penalty for deficit would be borne by all members of the brigade, and the 
value of each work-point would be determined on this basis. The brigade coordinators 
were appointed by the commune’s leadership, and except for a few, they had remained 
                                                 
7
 The Zhoujiazhuang Exhibition Hall exhibits reported that during the Cultural Revolution, 63 out of 
68 cadres of the commune, amounting to 92.6% of cadres, were removed from their positions; 30% of 
party cadres were expelled from the Communist Party; 10 villagers were killed.  
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in their position for over twenty years. The commune’s leadership explained why the 
coordinators were not normally changed: they must be people with competence, 
fairness, and moral authority, as their judgment and management would be paramount 
to the success of the brigade in fulfilling its assigned production targets, which would 
be intimately related to the income of all brigade members.  
 
Here lies one question: how to prevent abuse of power of the coordinators or the 
leadership? Lei Jinhe, as a communist from the grassroots, designed a set of rules that 
would be binding especially for those in authority positions. Back in the early 1950s, 
he had drawn up regulations forbidding privileges of the leadership, demanding that 
their work-points should be much the same as the ordinary members. After1978, when 
mainstream politics emphasized competition of individuals resulting in widening gaps 
between the rich and poor, Lei Jinhe formulated stringent rules and regulations to 
prevent polarizations within the commune, or grafting of public funds for private use. 
It was stipulated that no cadre of the commune was allowed to use the commune’s 
money for meals and drinks, for treating guests or sending gifts, and cadres receiving 
government subsidies must not double-count their work-points.  
 
This is how work-points were valued. The differential values would be calculated at 
the year end with the brigade as the unit. After deducting all production costs, water, 
electricity, food provisions and the pension fund, the value for the work-point would 
be set. As for the differentiation of over 370 work categories, the worth of each work 
category was set at the average output of a normal labourer. The production brigade 
coordinators were tasked to adjust the distribution of work to ensure each member got 
tasks of both high credit worth and low credit worth. The value of work-point in 
industry normally would be 30-50% higher than that of agriculture. Brigade 
coordinators had to ensure each family had members working in the different sectors 
so as to give approximate incomes to all. An important measure to ensure 
transparency and public monitoring was that all the brigade’s income, expenditure, 
and number of work-points of all cadres and members were publicly displayed.8 
 
While these micro-techniques of calculating work-points lay with the brigade 
coordinators, the commune’s overall strategic plans were determined by the 
leadership. Their visions and decisions therefore weighed heavily on the orientation 
and operation of the collective. Lei Jinhe had opted for growing cotton which became 
the main source of increased income for the collective both in the early 1950s and in 
                                                 
8
 “Zhoujiazhuang 2011 Annual Report and Plans for the Future”, 
http://121.28.35.250/a/2012/04/01/1333305427997.html 
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the early 1980s, though he did not go for a total shift to cash crops. Even when the 
commune went for setting up industries which brought much more income to the 
commune, agriculture was not given up. After the mid 1980s, when cotton market 
prices dropped due to over production, and agriculture in general yielded less and less 
profits, Zhoujiazhuang, instead of giving up on agriculture, decided a most important 
strategy of supporting agriculture with industry.  
 
The outcome was, instead of the general phenomenon of decrease in arable land all 
over China, the contrary happened in Zhoujiazhuang. Arable land was increased from 
16,000 mu in the 1950s to over 21,000 mu in the late 2000s. Since 2003, 1.6 million 
yuan had been invested into building 100,000 metres of leak-proof ridges and ditches 
in the fields to improve the irrigation system, hence releasing 110 mu of arable land 
and saving 1 million cubic metre of water per year while doubling the efficiency of 
irrigation.9 In 2010 when the region suffered from the worst cold weather in 30 years, 
Zhoujiazhuang’s still reaped a good harvest for its 17,000-mu of wheat. That is 
because the whole commune divided agricultural work among 10 specialized teams, 
each of 30-40 persons and one technician, and could respond to crises in a 
coordinated manner.10 After the early 1990s, loans to agricultural development by the 
commune were exempted from interest, unlike loans to the industrial sector.  
 
When asked why non-profit or low-profit agriculture was still kept, the answer was: 
so that villagers over 50 could still have work to do. The commune’s leadership had 
preferred labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries, in addition to agriculture, 
because one of the priorities of the commune was to offer employment opportunities 
to its members. The agricultural labour force as a proportion of the entire labour force 
had been decreasing from 78.9% in 1978 to 35.5% in 1999, and further down to 15% 
in the last few years. Mechanization had replaced much labour. Still, the arable land 
maintained its productivity, and the proportion of agricultural income in the total 
income of the commune dropped from xx% in 1978 to 20% in the 2000s, but had 
risen again in the last few years to 30% with the introduction of eco-tourism and the 
decline of industrial production after 2008.  
 
What was most commendable, in the eyes of the authors, was the way Zhoujiazhuang 
insisted on guaranteeing its food security. Lei Zongkui, the current chief of the 
                                                 
9
  Han Sanwei, Hu Wei: “Three decades of persistence in preserving arable land in Zhoujiazhuang”, 
China Land Resources Journal, 11 Sept 2009.10 “Zhoujiazhuang anticipates good wheat harvest”, 
Shijiazhuang Daily, 5 June 2010.  
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township and the cooperative, explained that “the commune runs on an accounting of 
market economy with the outside world, and planned economy within. After taking 
orders from outside, we do our planning within. How much population we have, how 
much food provisions each person would need, how many mu of land would be 
required for growing this, and then the remaining land would be used for other 
purposes. When all these calculations are done, there is nothing else to do except to 
make the arrangements for implementation by the brigades. Food provisions and daily 
vegetables such as winter cabbage would be grown by ourselves, there is no need to 
get them from the market.”11  
 
Obviously not everything can be explained by economic statistics of income, 
expenditure, or value added. What is implicit in the words of Lei Zongkui is a cultural 
choice, resisting the abandonment of agriculture for livelihood in favour of monetized 
advantages. In so many places in China today, arable land is left fallow because the 
yield in monetary terms is low, or the preference is for growing cash crops, or 
converting land to estates, roads or urban use. But in Zhoujiazhuang, it is otherwise. 
“Losing our land would be losing our roots!” was how a journalist summarized the 
mindset of the Zhoujiazhuang community.12 The singularity of the Zhoujiazhuang 
experience lay in its rurality – its persistence in adhering to a rural perspective in the 
relation to land, to agriculture, and to the beings living off the land and nature. 
 
Individual freedoms and collective benefits 
 
One negative observation about the Huaxi Village experience is the coercion of 
authoritarianism. Villagers would be entitled to the shares, luxury house, car and 
social welfare so long as they remained members of the commune. The entitlements 
of members of Huaxi Village One were not shared by the rest of the Greater Huaxi 
Village, that is, members of Huaxi Villages Two to Thirteen. In the case of 
Zhoujiazhuang, members of the production brigades did not have the right to choose 
what work assignments they were given. The production brigade coordinators had all 
the say on work allocation. However, members were allowed to run their own 
businesses or go outside for work, and still keep their membership and welfare 
through paying a premium of 1500 yuan for male adults and 1000 yuan for female 
adults. [find out why the premium is dropped in these last two years] They could also 
revert to working for the commune if they wished to give up their self-employment. 
In the 2000s, around 5% villagers were of this category of labour outside the 
                                                 
11
  From the authors’ interview with Lei Zongkui on 5 July 2012. 
12
  Han Sanwei, Hu Wei: “Three decades of persistence in preserving arable land in Zhoujiazhuang”, 
China Land Resources Journal, 11 Sept 2009. 
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commune; in 2012, the figure was around 20-25%.13 Such flexibility reduced 
resistances or grievances about coercive work and coercive membership.  
 
One reason many self-employed villagers opted to remain members of the commune 
was their entitlement to the commune’s benefits. Since 1981, eleven welfare items had 
been implemented to guarantee a decent livelihood for all members of the commune 
on an egalitarian basis. Villagers were provided with free tap water, subsidized 
electricity, free 9-year education, and health insurance. Elderly people over 65 
received a monthly pension. The handicapped, the sick, the widowed also received 
allowances. Families without a son could allow the daughter to inherit the property. 
From 1982 to 2002, in a coordinated plan to improve housing, the commune provided 
bricks and building materials at factory prices to the households, and the construction 
was done at no cost by the commune’s construction teams. Each house stood on an 
equal area of 0.298 mu, with 250 sq.m. of space, for cadres and ordinary members 
alike. In 20 years, the reconstruction of houses was completed, and over 800 mu 
housing plots were released for agriculture.  
 
In our meeting with Lei Zongkui, we asked about the problem of drain of young 
people from the township. Lei Zongkui responded that this was inevitable, as the 
township provided good education opportunities to the young people, and those 
finishing tertiary studies had expertise not relevant to the local needs of expertise on 
agriculture etc., and would have to find relevant jobs outside; in addition, urban life 
would be attractive to young people. The commune therefore would send its members 
or staff for technical training on relevant know-how, and seek expertise from experts 
from agricultural universities. Still, the proportion of educated young people returning 
to the township was more than 20%. Compared to other rural places, this figure was 
on the high side. As for migrant workers from outside the township, they constituted 
about 20% of the total labour force, and they were subject to the same system of 
work-points if they were employed by the commune. 
 
Finance in the times of speculation 
 
The last question the authors would like to deal with is: to what extent Zhoujiazhuang 
could resist the pressure or the seduction of the financialization of capital in the 
current times. Huaxi had become a giant conglomerate, and apart from investing on 
steel, construction and shipping etc., domestically and abroad, it was listed in the 
stock market, and it was therefore benefited by and vulnerable to the vacillations of 
                                                 
13
  From the authors’ interview with Lei Zongkui on 5 July 2012. 
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the capital market. Nanjie Village avoided investments into the capital market or 
ventures with MNCs, but it was reported to have obtained a lot of bank loans to keep 
it afloat, and the question of debt cast a shadow on its future. What about 
Zhoujiazhuang? 
 
We paid a visit to the Zhoujiazhuang Mutual Aid Credit Union in December 2011. It 
was formed in September 2008 as the first of its kind in Hebei Province. It had a 
registered capital of 10 million yuan: Zhoujiazhuang Cooperative, representing 13006 
members, contributed 6.36 million yuan, and the remaining 3.64 million yuan was 
received from individuals, self-employed enterprises and the commune’s corporations 
from within the township, with each share not less than 10,000 yuan and not more 
than 5% of the total capital. In July 2012, its deposits were about 300 million yuan, 
and its loans about 70-80 million yuan. Some deposits were used to buy state bonds or 
on fixed deposits with major banks. It was not the only financial institution in the 
township and it competed with the state’s credit unions and banks. Yet, it had operated 
on a steady basis, with dividends shared by all members of the commune (the 
Cooperative being the main shareholder) and by individual shareholders. Its loans 
were restricted to members of the commune. Lei Zongkui explained that their 
experience was unique, in that any loan was guaranteed by either the member’s 
year-end remuneration from the commune, or the fixed assets of the businesses. Since 
its operation, it had not had one case of bad debt. Mainstream economists might 
criticize the low loan-to-deposit ratio, which would mean profits for the credit union 
would be low, yet this was precisely its advantage. It served working capital needs 
within the township. The Credit Union was operated by 7-8 persons on a 
responsibility contract system, in the same mode as the industries or enterprises of the 
commune. The contract stipulated that they had a business quota to fulfill, or else they 
need to pay a penalty. The minimal number of staff ensured low operational cost, and 
the people’s connections within the commune ensured a relationship based on trust 
and confidence.  
 
Still, the enterprises and corporations of the commune normally had little need to 
borrow from the Mutual Aid Credit Union, since the commune itself had much capital. 
Ever since the early 1980s, the commune had not borrowed money from the state 
banks. Industries under the commune would borrow money from the commune, and 
pay an interest rate equivalent to or higher than bank interest rates. When agricultural 
sectors made a loan, the loan would be interest-free because the commune had a 
policy of support for agriculture. As the commune conducted all purchases of means 
of production, including machines, seeds, fertilizers, etc., the need for cash by the 
 18 
enterprises was low. When the industries which had generated much income before 
2008 started to falter with the macro economic decline, the commune would be 
confronted with difficulties, but it would not be vulnerable to the fluctuations of 
financial speculation.  
 
In 2011, Zhoujiazhuang had a total industrial and agricultural income of 685.29 
million yuan, net income of 158.9 million yuan, taxes of 31.85 million yuan paid to 
the state, and 113.24 million yuan distributed among commune members, with per 
capita cash of 8,616 yuan. Per capita net income was 12,095 yuan. The commune’s 
public fund amounted to 3.5566 billion yuan. Compared to 1978, the public fund had 
increased by 70 times, commune members’ livelihood level by 93 times, and total 
industrial and agricultural income by 116 times.14 
 
So speak the figures. In 2011, Zhoujiazhuang fared better than the Nanjie figures of 
per capita income of 6,700 yuan,15 but was very modest compared to the Huaxi 
figures of total revenue of 50 billion yuan, and per capita income of 88,000 yuan for 
the villagers.16 However, Zhoujiazhuang, compared to Huaxi, may offer us more 
insights into some of the conditions that make the practice of collectivism possible 
outside the dictates of capitalist relations, as manifested by the commune’s economic 
and political choices for agriculture, food security, self-sufficiency, full employment, 
collective welfare, equality, and the integrity and honesty of the commune members. 
This practice may open up imaginations for the enhancement of endeavours for 
alternatives which are ecologically and socially just, and shed light on paths for 
moving away from the curse of developmentalism and marketization – the capitalist 
path of greed and destruction.  
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  “Zhoujiazhuang 2011 Annual Report and Plans for the Future”, 
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15  “南街村“党员学习日”带动新农村建设”, 4 July 2012, 
http://bbs.2165588.com/thread-60344-1-1.html 
16
  Wu Xie’en, Huaxi Corporation General Director, spoke to the China Economic Net, 11 Nov 2012. 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/zhonggong18da/content-3/detail_2012_11/11/19037171_0.sht
ml 
